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Abstracl
In this paper we consider the dynamic behavior of a lirm subject to environmental
regulation. As a social planner the governmcnt wants to reducc thc Icvcl uf pollution. To
reach that aim it can, among others, set an upper limit on polluting cmissionx ofthe firm.
The paper determines how this policy instrument inlluences the firm's dccisions concerning
investments, abatement efforts, and the choice whethcr to leave some capacity unused or
not.
The abatement proccss is modclcd as input substilution rathcr than cnd-ol'-pilx. Using
standard control theory in determining the firm's optimal dynamic invcstmcnt decisions it
turns out that it is always optimal to approach a long run optimal Icvcl ofcapital. In some
cases, this equilibrium is reached within Finite time, but uxually it will lx~ approached
asymptotically.
Different scenarios are considered, ranging from attractive clean input to unattractive clean
input, and from a mild emission limit to a very tight onc.
It is shown that for largc capital stocks andlor whcn marginal cush Ilow pcr unil oF
emissions is larger for the dirty input than for thc dcan input, it can be oplimal to actually
leave some production capacity unused..Also, since the convex installation costs suggest to
spread investments over time, it can happen that investment in productivc capital is positive
although capacity remains unuscd.
Kcy Worcis
Optimal control, Environment, Dynamic programming, Praduction and investment, Input
substitution.
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1. Introduction
Currently, an important problem of a firm is how to rcacl on environmcntal rcgulution. Acting as a
social planner thc govcrnment wants to rcducc cmissionx gcncralcd by lhc Iinn's production procexs.
To reach this aim it can use inslrumcnts likc imposing an uppcr limit on Ixillulion gcncrated by thc finn,
imposing a pollulion tax, or it can crcalc a markcl whcrc thc firm must huy pcrmits in ordcr to lx;
allowed to pollute the environment.
According to Jorgenson and Wilcoxcn (199U) possiblc lirm's responscx to environmcntal regululion arc
invexting in abatement tcchnology, i.c. thc use of special dcviccs to Ircal wastcs aftcr [hcy have bcen
generated, and changing thc production process to reducc cmissions. Thc lirst response is commonly
known as end-of-pipc abatement and is often the choice whcn existing lirms havc to meet ncwly
imposed standards.
Comparcd lo cnd-of-pipc abatcmcnt a morc modcrn apprciach is changin~, thr production prcxcss in
ordcr to rcducc cmissions. Thc Icasl disruptivc way of doing Ihis is lo swilch lu clcancr inputs. A
straightforward cxamplc is availablc from clcctric ulilitics, namcly switching from high-sulfur to low-
tiulfur coal in ordcr to comply with restrictions on wlfur diuxidc cmixsions (lurgcntion and Wilcoxcn,
I 990).
In this papcr wc want lo cstahlish optimal dynamic lirm Fx~havior, whilc Ihc lirm'x cmissions arc limitcd.
Il is atitiumcd Ihal in thc xhorl run thc linn has Iwu posxihilitic. lu rcducc ils own cmitixiunx: il can
dcrrcatic lircxlurtiun hy Iravinp suinr pnKlurlion caparily nuu.crd, ur il cau u.r a rlran hin cxlxxnxivc
inpul inztcad ola dirty and nc~ali input in Ihc prudurtion pnK~css. In Ihc long run Ihc linn can rcckun
with Ihis cmission limit hy adjuxting its invctitmcm prugram.
Dynamic tirm behavior under an emission limit was also suhjccl of study in liartl and Kort (1993), Kon
(1994) and Xepapadeas (1992). Xcpapadeas analyzcd cnd-of-pipc abatcmcnl r.nhcr than input
tiuh~liluli~m, whilc amlrary tci thi.e w~crk, his :maly~is iti limilcd lu rcduli~m.~ whrrc Ihc cnvinmmcnlal
cuntilrainl is alwayti hinding. I Icrc wc ~~uuxidcr trau,iUcws liinu ~iluatiuuti whcir Ihc amslraim i,
binding to situalions whcrc thc comtraint is non-hinding and thc othcr way ruund. lJndcr which
scenarios do these transitions occur und how arc thclc affccted by lhe Icvcl of lhc cmission limi['? In thc
present paper, input substitution is modeled morc prcci~cly than in Hartl and Korl (1993) and Kort
(1994) in the sense that herc wc cxactly spccify thc amount of both inputx bcing uscd at any time, rathcr
than idcntifying a variablc for ahatcmcnt cxpcndilures which rcprescnts moncy lotil duc lo input
substitution. Moreover, in this conlribution the above mcntioncd papcrs arc cxlcndcd by allowing thc
firm to leave some capacity unu.led in the production process.
The model of the firm is specified as an optimal control prohlem (Section 2), which is solved by
performing a two step approach. The two steps are identified in Section 3, while in Section 4 step I is
solved by determining the optimal use of the inputs and the production capacity Ibr every given Ievel of
the stock ofcapital goods. The optimal investmcnt program is cstablishcd in Section 5, given the
optimal use of inputs and production capacity. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
Considcr a lïrm having a slcxk of capital goods, K, lhrough which it can producc output, Q(K). It is
reusonahlc lo assumc that
Q(0~-0. Q'~KÍ~O. Q"ÍK~~O.
Thc actual prcxtuclion Icvcl, y, must thcrofore satixly
0~9 ~Q(K~-
(I)
(2)Hartl - Kort 2 Input Substitution
Production ofthis y rcyuires thc usc of a variable inpul, wherc the firm has thc possibility to use a cheap
and dirty input, I~, andlor an cxpcnsivc and dc.m inpw, n. ns practical cxamplc.ti wc think of the
possibility of choicc bctwccn chcap and dirty high sulfur coal and cxpcnsivc and clcan low sulfur coal by
clcctric ulilitics or if in somc pn~ccsx harmful cxhausl fumcs arc gcncratcd (c.g. dioxins when burning
somc malcrial e.g. waslc), onc can usually reducc thcsc cmissions by incrcasing thc tempera[ure in this
process by using morc or diftèrcnt additional oil.
Let us assume the following relationship between output q and total inpul FtA:
q - G(FtA).




This formulation implies that no substitution is possiblc Ix~lwccn thc (shorl tcrm) lixcd input K and thc
variable inputs F and A. It turns out that the rela[ion between the production I'unctions Q and G play an
important rate in the solution. We come back to this in Subscction 4.4.4.





b~ ~ bz (6)
since A is the „clean" input.
Let the unit price of the two inputs F and A be given by v, and v,, respectivcly wilh
vi G vZ. (7)
since the clean input A is more expensiva Therefore, A- 0 is associuted with the input choice of a
profit maximizing firm in absence ofany form ofenvironmenlal regululion.
Of course, both inputs arc always non-ncgativc:
F?0, A?0. (x)
Thc government reduces pollution by imposing a fixcd uppcr bound on cmissions. Let Z be the
maximum permitted volume at time t. The emission conslraint for the lirm at cach instant of time is
E(A, F) 5 Z. (9)
Because capacity can remain unused, this construint can afwayx he met by a suf7icicntly low valuc of y,
no matter how large K and thercforc Q(K) is.
The capi[al stock can be increased by productive investments 1 where investment costs equal C(1) for
which we assume
C(~) - ~, C'(f) ~ 0, C"(I) ~ Q (10)Hartl - Kort 3 Input Substitution
On the other hand, the capital stock decreases by depreciation at rate a.
We assume that the firm is „small" in the sense that its product can be sold on the market at a fixed
market price p.
Ifwe further assume that the firm maximizes cash flow and discounts against rate r(r ~ 0 and constant),
we obtain the following dynamic model of the firm:
max Je-rt{oq-vtF-v~A-C(I~3dt
t'q,A'F 0
s.t. K- l-aK, K(0~- Ktl




As an additional assumption we impose that it always pays to usc full capacity if lhe emission constrainl
is absent, i.e.,
c~(~) ~ ~~ip.
Nulicc Ilcd Ihc firm only uscti thc clicap inpul I~, in rasc Ihrrr i~ no rnvirunnicntal rcgulalion.
(IZ)
3. A 7wo Step Approach
It is convenicnt to define K- K("L~ as the largest capital stix:k Ibr which producing with using only the
dirty input F, i.c. A- 0, is in accordancc wilh thc cmisxion limit, whcn thc finn uscx all of its production
capacity, i.c., when y- Q(K):
A-O, F-F-7.~ht, G(7.Iht)-Q(K).
Furthcrmorc, wc dcfinc K us thc largest K liir which full capacity can tx; uxcd whilc thc cmission
constraint iti still satistied:
F-O, A-A-Z~b2, G(ZIb2)-Q(K).
Clearly, K ~ K and A 1 Fsince b~ c bt.
(14)
Sincc thc runuol variahlrx y, I:, and A do nol rnlcr Ihr syslrm dynamics. Ihis nrodcl can tx~ U-catcd hy
applying a Iwo slcp approach; cl~. I larll (19R8):Hartl - Kort 4 Input Substitution
Step 1: For every lïxcd K, solvc lhc slalic problcm ol maximiring rcvcnuc minus expcnses on thc






Step 2: With y(K), A(K) and F(K) computcd in Slcp I, solvc thc follawing control problcm:
max ~é`~{pq(K)-vIF(K)-v~A(K)-C(I)}dt
1 11
IC - I -aK, K(0) - KII
4. Solution of Step 1








LA -{PG'(Ff A)-vz}-FtI~G'(Ff A)]-lt2~b2]}4t3 -0 (17a)
LF-{pG'(FtA)-vl}-N~~G'(FfA)]-ft2~b1]t(t4-0 (176)
E11~Q(K)-G(FtA)]-0 (17c)
N2LZ-bIF-b2A] - 0 (17d)
Ft3A-waF-O.




It is impossible that Nz -~t~ - 0 at the same time, i.e. that thc clcan input ís uxcd, A ~ 0, and the
emission limi[ is not binding, hl Ft bZA ~ Z.
Prool; Follows immediately from v~ ~ v, and equation ( IA).
I.cmma 2: - - -
(17e)
(18)
11 is imlxis.ihlr that Etl - N, -11 :U Ihc samc limc, i.r. Ihat capacity is nul lully uscd, G~Ff A~~ Q(K~,
and thc cmission limil is not binding, bl Ff b,A ~"L.
Pmof: Follows immediately from ( 12) and (17b). ~Hartl - Kort 5 Input Substitution
Now it is convenient to consider three different c:~ceti characterired by timall, medium, and large capital
titocks:
C'asr I: K S K,
c';ixr ?: K ., K . K
C;~sc 3: K ? K
4.1 The Analysis of Casc 1: K s K
Clcarly, by dclinitiun of K, this implicti lhal fur K ~ K thc cn~is~iun liniit i, nut hinding, L ~'L. l3y
[.emmas 1 and 2, this means that A- 0 and that full capacity is used. Therefore, in this case F has a one
to one correspondence to K, that can be deno[ed as F- F(K), which satixlics
G(F(K)) - Q(K)
Figure I illustrateti this siluatiun.
Fiaure I: Thc casc uf K 5 K.
F(K)-G-~(Q(KI)-
F
4.2 The Analysis of Case 2: K ~ K ~ K
Clearly, sincc K~ K this mcanti that for A- 0 thc cmisxion limit is violatcd whcn using full capacity.
Since K ~ K, using full capacity while producing with only the clean input, A, (i.e., F- 0) causes
emissions being less than Z. Thus there is an intersection of thc lines G(AtF) - Q(K) and E- Z in the
A-F-planc;scc Figurc 2.
Fieure 2: The case of K ~ K ~ K
A
I~rom I,cmma I wr know Ihat li -"I, if A ~ U, anJ xincr I.cmma 2 implic. that f: -"l, if G(FtA) ~ Q(K),
wc can concludc that only thc following Suhcascs 2.1, 2? and 2.3 arc ixr,xibic; scc alu~ Figure 2.Harti - Kort 6
4.2.1 Subcase2.1: A~O,F~O,q~Q(K)
By (17ce), (tg - ttq - 0 and It~- 0. Now, (17ab) yield
pG'(FfA) - vzb~ -v~b2 ~ 1.
bf-b2
(20)
Since G is strictly concave, F und A ar~c uniquely dclennincd by (20) and the cmissions being equal to
their upper bound: E- b~ Ft b,A - Z.
Furthcrrnorc, (ZO) l'aO altio tX; WfIUCn AS:
pG'(FfA)-v~ -pG'(FfA)-vz
b~ - 62 ~
(21)
This implics that in this subcasc thc addilional cash Flow pcr unit of additional cmissions, resulling from
producing with an ex[ra uni[ of the variahlc input is thc same for tx~th inputs.
4.2.2 Subcase 2.2: A ~ 0, F~ 11, q- Q(K)







we concludc that in this casc thc additional cash Ilow pcr unit uf additional emissions resulting from
producing with an cxtra unil of A cxcccds thc udditional cash flow pcr unil of additional cmissions
resulting I'rom producing wilh an cxh~a unil ol' F. Thcrcforc, il nrakcs scnsc that in this subcasc lhc Iirnt
chooses to reduce emissions by using the clean input A ralher than by Ieaving a part of the produc[ion
capacity unused.
Therefore, capacity is used at the muximal level whilc lhe cmission constraint is hinding.
F and A are uniquely determined by
Q(K)-G(FfA), Z-6~Ftb2A. (23)
4.2.3 Subcase2.3: A-O,F~O,q~Q(K)
By (17ce), pq- 0 and (t ~- 0. Therefore, (17ab) yield
Ft2 - PG (F)-vl ~ PG (F)-v2 ~
bi 62
which implies [hat the additional cash tlow per unit of additional emissions arising from producing with
an extra unit of F exceeds the additional cash flow per unil of additional emissiom due to production
with an extru unit of A. This explains why the expensive clean input is not used in this subcase. The
above inequality leads to
Input Substitution
pG,(F)~ h~v~ -b2v~ . (~4)
bi -bZ
Notice [hat the (irm uscs F whilc thc cmission constraint is hinding, so Ihal F-"Ll h~ - F.Hartl - Koil 7 - Inpul Suhtiuluui,n
4.3 The Analysis of Case 3: K? K
Clearly, if K~ K this means that full capacity can never txx used even if thc lirm produceti with only Ihc
clean input, i. e. we have the situation depicted in Figurc 3, where the capacity constraint is never
binding.
I~:mma 2 implics [hal lhc cmixxion limil mutit Fx~ binding.
I:




4.3.1 Subcase 3.1: A ~ 0, F ~ 0, q ~ Q(K)
Thc cyuations for dctcrmining F and A and [hc condilionx undcr which Ihis xulx:asc is optimal arc lhc
samc as in Sutx:asc 2. I.
a.3.a sunca,e 3.2: n~ o, F- ~~, y ~ c?(h)
By (17cc), ft~ - 0 and ~ti - 0. "I'hcn, (17ah) imply
pG'(A)-v2 ~ pG'(A)-v~
bZ bi
Hence, the firm dces not produce with F, sincc the marginal cash Flow pcr unit of marginal emissions,
resulting from producing with an extra unit of F, is Icss than thc marginal cash Ilow per unit of marginal
emissions, resulting from producing with an extra unit of A.
The above inequality can be written as:
pG,(A) ~ b~v2 -b~v~
b~ -b2
Here we see that the emission constraint is binding while the firm only uscs A. This implies thut
A-ZIb2-A.
(25)
4.3.3 Subcase 3.3: A- 0, F~ 0, y ~ Q(K)
'fhc cyuatiuns liir dclcrmining P anJ A and Ihc cunditions undcr which lhis sutx:rsc ís optimal arc lhc
samc as in us Subcasc 2.3.Haztl - Kort 8 Input Substitution
4.4 Summary of the Results of Step 1- Different Scenarios:
In Figure 4, we combine the resultti of Scction 4.3 in a 3-dimensional picturc in Ihc A-F-K-spaco. 'fhc
emission constraint E- Z is the plane tx(3~5. The capacity constraint is given by the surface oa~3, which
is sketched as a plane here. At K- K, represented by point R, one switches from Case I to Case 2. At
K- K, represented by point a, one switches from C~tie 2 to Case 3. The cases and subcases are
identified by numbers in Italics.
A






From the above cases and their analysis we obtain the following three possiblc uenarios ( F and Á are
defined in ( I 3) and (14):
Scenario I: pG'( F) ~ B
Scenario 2: pG' (Á) ~ B ~ pG'( F)
Sccnario 3: pG' ( A)~ B




(27)Hartl - Kort 9 Input Subslitutiun
Since G is concave and b~ ~ b2, this ineyuality also holdti for input levels exceeding F. This implies that
for all these levels it holds that the marginal cash flow pcr unit of marginal emissions due to producing
with an cxlra unit of input is grcater for F than for A. Thcrofore, in what followx we denole [his
Scenario I by „Unallraclive Cleun Inptu Srenurin".




Hairc, producing with an cxtra input A yicldti [hu highcxt catih Iluw pcr unit uf rctitrictcd cmissions.
Thcrcl'orc, wc will dcnolc thiti sccn:u-iu hy „~llrut lirr (7rurt InlttN ,Srrnurin".
For obvious reasons, in what follows the intermcdiatc Sccnariu 2 will tx~ dcnutcd hy „Muderulelv
Attructive Clean Inpu1 Scenctrio".
4.4.1 SCENARIO 1- UNATTRACTIVE CLEAN INPU'f: pG'( F) ~ B
If pG'( F) ~ B, then the optimal slcp I solution is:
~G-~(Q(K)) 9-~Q(K) (~ Z ~ ~0, K~ cusc I
A- Q F- Ejl for K e (29)
F Q(K)' -Z (K,~) casc2.3or3.3
IfG is "morc concave" than Q(ticc altio suhscction 4.4.4 latcr on) F(K) will bc convcx for K ~ K. This












Fipure 6: The path in the A-F-K-tipace when K increases in lhc
Unattractive Clcan Input Sccnariu I.
Clcarly, if Ihc total amounl of inpul, FtA, fallti hclow P, cmistiions rcmain ttcluw Ihcir uppcr limit; cl~.
(13).'I'hcn Ihcrc is no nccd to pruducc wilh Ihc cxlx:nxivc inpul n so Iltal pnuin~ n cynal to zcrn iti
optimal in Ihis casc.
Remember that from (27) we could derivc Ihat for total input Icvels cxcccding F il holds that marginal
cash Flow per unit ofrestricted emissions ix greater for F than for A. Hence, wc can conclude that here
it is ncvcr optimal for thc firm to utic lhc cxpcnsivc and clcan input A in Ihc production prctccsti.
Apparenlly, (27) implics Ihal for this sccnariu lhc lowcr cmixsions gcncratcd hy A do not
counterbalance the fact that this input i~ morc expensivc.
4.4.2 SCENARIO 2- MODERATELY ATTRACTIVE CLEAN INPUT:
pG'(Á)~B~pG'(F)
If pG'(ï~ ) ~ B ~ pG'( F), then thc optimal stcp I solution ix:
0 G-'(Q(K)) Q(K) ~Z ~O,K~ caul
A- ~0 , F- ~0 , y- Q(K), E-Z forKe (K,K) cau2.2
{Á~A F~F Q(K) ~-Z K,~) carc2.l or3.l ~
whcrc A anJ F arc uniyucly dctcrmincd hy
pci'(I~tn)-13. i.c. I~tn-(ti')'(B~p) and I:(n.F)-n,Fth,n-'I. (31)
which yields:
~- z- nl ~G.)-~(Bip). i.-- i t n, (G')-'(Bip).
h, - n, h~ - h, n, -b, h~ - n,Hartl - Kort I I Input Subslilutiun
[t is easily checked that Ihe non-ncgalivity of A and F is cyuivalcnt wilh pG'( A) ~ B ~ pG'( F).
Furthermore, K is detined by
G(A t F) - Q(K). (32)
Undcr lhc atisumpliun thal G iti "marc concavc" lhan Q(scc also subscction 4.4.4) Ihc s[cp I solutiun
louks as in Fiburc 7.
F, A
Fieure 7: Solution of titep I in the Moderately Attractive Clean Inpul Scenario 2
Notc that, apart from thc fact thut F ~ F, wc do not know bcforchand how Ihc ranhing of lhc Icvclz of
F, F, and A is.
A~. ~ r
Fissure A: The path in lhe A-F-K-xpace when K increascs in Ihe Mcxlerately A[tractive
Clean Input Sccnario 2.Hartl - Kort 12 Input SubslituUun
Let us interpret this step I solution. As befbrc, for K e~0, K~ thcre is no nced to replace the cheap inptu
F by the expensivc and clcan input A, xo that A cyualti zcro hcre.
If K- K and F- F Ihc cmissiun limit i~ binding, whilc il holds that
pc~)~B ~ pG~~-~z ~~~~~-"'.
b2 b,
(33) implics thal Ihe marginal cash Ilow pcr unit of marginal cmixsions, duc lo producing wilh an
additional inpul, iti highcr for A Ihan fur t~. Thcrcforc, il is prulïlable fur Ihc firm tu kccp on pnxlucing
with full capacity whcn K incrcases marginalty, whilc at thc samc timc thc tirm muxt rcducc F and
inercase A such that emissions remain eyual to Z. In 1'act, this policy is optimal fur cvery capilal slc~ck
level in the in[erval ( K, K).





This means that the m~rginal cash tlow per unit of marginal cmissions, duc to producing with an extra
input, is the same for both inputs. Therefore, for K~ K thc marginal revenuc pG' is tcw low for
counterbalancing the high costs of the expensive inpul A, when thc lirm produccx with full capacity.
This implies [hat, for stocks of capital goods being larger than K, it is optinwl tu Icuve some cupacity
unused so that A does not nced to be larger than A in ortlcr to tiatitify thc emission limit.
4.4.3 SCh,NARIO 3- A'1'1'RACTIVI? CLF.AN INPU'I': pG'(n )~ B
If pG'(A) ~ B, then lhe optimal stcp I solution ix:
( U ~G-t((!(K))







~"I, Ill. K I c:r~c I
- Z for K E ( K, K) casc 2~ (3S)
- Z ~K, ~) c:t.tie 3.2
hiiurc 9: tiululiun ul xlcp I in Ihc Altrartivr ('Ican Inpul tirrnariu iHartl - Kort 13 Input Substitution
IHj!ure I11: Thc path in thc A-F-K-spacc whcn K incrc;cscti in thc Allractivc ('Ican Inpul Sccnariu 3.
Aguin for K E~0, K~ thc emission limit is aulomatically satistïcd. Thcrcliirc, it makcti no xcnsc hcrc lu
leave some capacity unused or to use the expensive input A in the production prcxess.
In casc K E~ K, K~ wc can dcrivc from (2R) Ihal prcxlucing with inpul A yiclds Ihc highcsl cash Ilow Ixr
unil uf rr~lrirtrd cinissium.'I~hcrrG~rr, Ihr lirm pruclurcti wilh full c:yiacily whilc il :uljuslti Ihr inpul
Icvcls F and A such that thc cmixsiun cunstraint iti binding.
For K e~ K,~~ it hulds that producing with full capacity always viulatcx Ihc cmission constraint, cvcn
when only lhe clean input A is uscd. Thcrcforc, thc lirm is forccJ to Icavc somc capacity unuscd. It
kceps emissions cyual to Z by tixing thc inputs F and A at rcro and A, rc~pcctivcly.
4.4.4 Variable Inputs as Functions of Crpital Sti~ck Under N'ull Capacity
In Sccnarios 2 and 3, i.c., in thc Mcxlcratcly Auraclivc ('Ican Inpul Sccnario ancl Ihc Attraclivc Clcan
Input Sccnario, thc functions A(K) and F(K) appcarcd in SuFx asc 2.2. Givcn thc c~hjcctivc (16a), it is
important to invctitigatc whcthcr Ihc function v~ (~( K)f v~A( K) is convcx ur nul. Wc rcc;ill from (2~)
thal A(K) and F(K) arc dcfincd by:
FtA-S(K) and blFth2A-7,
whcre S(K) is defined as
S(K)-G-I(Q(K)).
Thc wlution uf Ihis systcm uf linrar cyuatiuns ix:
"I.
A(K)- hI S(Kl- , , F(K)-
-h, S(K)}
h, - h2 b, - h, h, - n, h, - h~
(~h~
(3x)Hartl - Kort 14 lnpul Subslilulion
Thus, for the Moderately At[ractive Clean Input and the Attractive Clean Input Scenarios we obtain
[he following result:
Lemma 3: In Sulxasc 2.2 Ihc cusl of inpul ix givcn hy
v11~fK)tv,A(K)-13 S(K)-v2-v~'L. .. hl - n2
which is convcx, if S(K) is convex, i.c. if G is "murc concavc" Ihun Q
In ordcr to comparo lhis input cost with thc correspunding tcrm in Casc I, wc nolc frum ( 19), th:d
F- S(K) and A- 0, i.c., thc corresponding inpul cotil in ('asc I is vtS~K~. II i~ caxily chcckcd th.d for
K- K this tcrm yiclds Ihc same result as (39).
Furthcrmorc, from B? v~ it is clcar thaC
I,emma 4: As K increases in the Muderately Attractive Clcan Inpw anct the Allractive Clean Input
Sccnario onc passcs from Catic I lo Suhca~c 2.2 al K- K. In Ihiti point, Ihc marginal input cost
jumpz upwards from v~S'(K~ to [3S'(K~.
From an economic point of view, Lcmma 4 is eaxy to underxtand, since, contrary to the case wherc
K ~ K, for K ~ K the (irm must use the cxpensive input A to satisfy the emission limit when the capital
stock increaties marginully.




Fiaure 11: The cost of variable input v~ Ft v,A in the Mcxleratcly Attractive Clean Input
Scenario and the Attractive Clean lnput Scenario is a convex function of capital
for K ~ K and K ~ K, respectivcly.
In what follows we will always assume lhat S(K) is convex. Economically this mcans that the total
variable input incrcases more than proportionally with the ~hort lcrm tixed input K when the hrm
produces with full capacity.Hartl - Kort IS
5. Analysis of Step 2
Input Subxlilulion
5.1 The Maximum Principle
With q(K), A(K) and F(K) computed in Step I, we now solve the following control problem:
~ rt max e- {pq(K)-v~F(K)-v2A(K)-C(I)}dt
0
s.t. K- I- aK, K(0) - Kp.
This leads to the Hamiltonian
H - pq(K)- v~F(K)- v2A(K)-C(I)t ~.~I -aK~,
and the ncccssary optimulity cundilions aro:








Slric[ly spcaking, thc adjoint cyuatiun (44) unly holds fur lhorc K, whcrc F(K), A(K) and y(K) arc
diffcrcntiablc in K. At Ihc kinks K- K(in all sccnarios) and K- K(McKlcralcly Attractivc ('Ican
Inpul Sccn:~rio) or K- K lAurarlivr ('Ic:m lupul Srcn,iriol, thc diflcrcnlial ryu:dion mutil Ix~
rcplaccd hy Ihc dilfrrrntial inclutiiun
r~ ~, ~ r~Kl I. 14i)
where ~K dcnotes tbc generalircd gradicnt uf H w.ct. K; tice Clarke (19K3). In our casc, (45)
evalua[ed at thc kinks mcntioncd atxrvc is the intcrval Ix lwccn r.h.~. and Lh.s. dcrivalivc of H w.r.l.
K. In thc appcndix thcsc intcrvals arc invcsligalcd and it is tihown thal all inlcrvals arc non-cmpty,
which means thut existence of the solution ix assurcd.
For t-r ~ the limiting trunsvcrsality condition holds:
lim c-'~~,(t)-0.
Unfortunutely, the usual sufficiency conditions (using concavity) aro nol salislicd. Also, it is diflicull
to verify any of the existing results on thc limiting transvcrzality condition tu Ix~ a ncccssary
condition. Nevertheless for reasonti ofeconomic intcrpretation it is not unrcationablc to assume that
only thosc solulionx makc scnsc whosc shadow pricc ~ rcmaim boundcd or dcxa not divcrgc at a
ratc largcr lhun thc discounl ratc.
5.2 Qualitativc Analysis in the Phasc Planc:
In urdcr to txrfurm a pha~c pl:mc :malyxis in thc (K,I )-pl:cnc, wc lirsl uhscrvr that thc K- 0 isocainc
is thc straight linc I- aK. Ncxl, wc havc to dcrivc a diffcrcntial cyuation liir I li-om thc adjoint
cyuation (44). This is donc by dillcrcntiatíng (43) w.r.t. timc t and wbscyucnt climination of the
costate ~, using (43). Keeping in mind thc kinks mentioned atxivc, this yiclds:Hurtl - Kort 16
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j- I ~(ita~'(I)-pQ~(K)tBS'(K)~ ~,,,( I ) (46h)
for K ~ K ~ K in thc Modcratcly Attractivc Clcan Input Sccnario and for K ~ K ~ K in thc
Attractive Clcan Input Scenario (sec alzo L.cmma 3), and linally
- ~ I(rta~(.,(I)I
(''( I ) l-thrl
fur K ~ K in Ihi~ l InaUraclivc ('Ir.m Inpu1 ticru:u iu, lin K. K in Ihr Muilrr:drly Atuarlivr c'Iran
Input Scenario, und for K~ K in thc Auractivc Clcan Input Sccnario.
With these, we can compute the slope of the I- 0 isocline. It is convenient to u-cat the three regionti
separately.
Firsl, wc considcr thc rcgion uf a small capital titcx k whcrc Ihc cmissiun conslraint i~ not binding,






since we have assumed that S(K) is convex.
On the other hand, when the capital stock is so large Ihat the emisxion cunsu'aint i~ binding but s[ill
y- Q(K), i.c., for K ~ K ~ K in Ihc Modcratcly Atu'activc Clcan Input Scrn:u~io :md far K ~ K ~ K
in the Attraclive Clean Input Scenario, we oblain
dl
dK
- pQ"- BS" ~ 0.
Í-o ~r t a~C" (47b)
Notice that in the Moderately Altractive Clcan Input Scenario it holdti that pG' - B for K- K, and
this implies pQ' - BS'. Since C' ~ 0 and C" ~ 0, ati assunted in ( 10), we obtain from (466) that the
I- 0 isocline leaves the first yuadrant (region K? 0 and I? 0) for some K ~ K.
Finally, whcn thc r.ipital titock is su largc Ihat it is not ohlimal lo usc lhc lolal production capacity,
i.c., in lhc rcgion K~ K in Ihc Unalu'activc Clcan Input Sccnario ~ I ~, in Ihc rcgiun K 7 K in thc
Moderatcly Auraclive Clcan Input Sccnario (2~, and in Ihc region K~ K in lhe Attractive Clean
Input Sccnariu ~3~, thcn (46c) holdx and, duc to (10), wr can roncludc that I ~ 0 in lhis case.
F i-




if K" ~ K; see case (a) below.
Thc second cyualion in (48) says that in cyuilibrium marginal rcvcnuc cyualti nr.trginal invctitmcnt
costs plus ntarginal input costs.Hartl - Kort 17 Input Substitution
The determinan[ of the Jacobian of the dynamical system (41) anJ (46a) evaluatcd at the cyuilibrium
can eatiily be computed:




If K ~ K then the equilibrium is a saddle point.
On the other hand, for K ~ K ~ K in the Moderately Attractive Clean Input Scenario and for
K~ K ~ K in thc Attrac[ivc Clean Input Sccnario, thc stcady slatc iti dclincd by
1~ - aK~, pQ'(K~) -(rta)C'(I~) t BS'(K~);
scc casc (c) hclow.
(SO)
~ -
flerc, oppositc to the casc K ~ K, additiunal cxpcnscs un input ( morc cxpcnsivc input A) urc
ncccsti:uy to kccp pollution cyual lo Ihc stand:u-d Icvcl whcn capital stcxk incrcatics marginally.
Conscyucnlly, m:uginal cxpcnscs arc BS'(K") which arc highcr lhan marginal input cxpcnscs
viS'(K~) in the unregulated case. This results in a smaller equilibrium compared to the unregulu[ed
catic.
Now, thc dyn:miical tiyslcni cunxisls iif (41 ):mil (4(~hl, implying Ucd thr drlrrniinanl of Ihr .Iaruhian.
cvaluatcd al Ihc stcady xlalc, cyualti




If K ~ K~` ~ K in the Moderately Attractive Clcan Inpul Scenario or K ~ K~ ~ K in the Attractive
Clean Input Scenario, then the cyuilibrium (K~,1~) is a saddlc point.
We note tha[ for K~ K in the Unattractive Clcan Input Sccnario 1, for K~ K in the Moderately
Attractivc Clean Input Sccnario, or Ibr K~ K in thc Auractivc Clcan Input Sccnario no cyuilibrium
is putisiblc, sincc Ihc 1- 0 ixuclinc ducs not cxist ( I ix always Ixisitivc).
5.3. Optimal tirm behavior without environmental regulation
Bcliirc wc pnxccd with thc phasc planc analysiti, Ict us fïrzt dcrivc thc tiolutiun in Ihc caxe of no
rcgulation, so that we have a tx~nchmark casc. Thcn, thcrc is no inccntivc for using the expensivc
clcan input or Icaving capacity unuscd. Thiti Icads to a phasc planc whcrc thc Í- 0 isoclinc and thc
K- 0 isoclinc can bc ohlaincd from (46u) and (4I ) respcclivcly (ux Figurc 12).Harll - Korl I8 Input Substiwtiun
FiLUre 12: 'I'hc hcnchmark casc uf no cnvirunmcntal rcgulalion.
Thc steady statc is prescntcJ in (48) and, duc to (49), wc know Ih:d it is a xaddlc puinl. Aftcr xolving
the difTerential cyualion (44) (wilh F(K) - S(K), A(K) -O and y(K) - Q(K)), suhstiluting (43) inlo
this rclation and using (48) as a IixcJ poinl, wc dcrívc Ihc lidlowing conditiun which huWs for cach t:
(c-(rk:~)(.-~ ){PQ~(K(s)~- vIS'~K(x)~~Ix -("~I(1)~- O,
where the Icft-hand side is thc net prescnt v~luc of marginal invcstment. For an interprclation
consider the acquisition of un exlra unit of capital at time t. Thc lirm incurs an extra expense at time l
in amount of C'. On the other hand, the marginal unit ofcupital gencratcs - as of timc t- a stream of
cash flow. This cush flow stream, th~t is corrected for depreciation and discounting, equals revenue
from selling products made with the extra cupital stc,ck rninus input spendingti Ihat are necded for
Ihis cx[ra production. Condition (S2) thcn slatcs that thc nct prescnt valuc of nr.irginal invctilmcnt
cquuls 2cro. Hencc, thc fundamcntal cconomic principlc uf halancing marginal rcvcnuc with marginal
expenseti applieti.
5.4. Qualitative analysis ofthe solution in the phase plane
From Subxcction 5.2 wc know thal thc I- 0 ixcxlinc is always Jccrcasing. II iti clcar from Lcmma 4,
(46a), and (4(,h) thal thc I 0 isix~linc wllcrti :r downward jump at K- K. In Ihc nttractivc Clcan
Input Sccnariu Ihc I- 0 iuxainc is vcrtiailly shapcd al K- K, sincc, hy (46c), it alwayti holds that
1~ 0 for K ~ K. Therefore thc Attractivc Clean Input Scenario Icadx to four txisxihililicti
conceming the intertiection of the two isoclines:
(u) inlersectionfor K ~ K, i.e. where cunstrcrint (9) i.c nnl hindin,S
(h) inrersectinn fnr K- K, i.e. u! the,~irsl di.cc nnliru~il y nfdre- I 0 iav,rlinr
(c) inter.ceclinn Ji~r K c K ~ K rrr K c K c K, i.i~. wherr rnn.~MUiiN (9) i., liindinl;
(d) inlrr.eerlinnJbr K - K







Fieure 13: The two cases in the Unattractive Clenn Inpul Scenario ~ I ~. For K ~ K the Í- 0
isoclinc docs not cxist sincc hcre alwayx I~ 0.





lCasc cl ~ ~ K K
Fieure 14: The three cases in the Moderately Auractive Clcan Input Scenario ~2jHartl - Kort 20
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hiLUrc I5: Thc fuur casrs in Ihr Athaclivc ('Ican Inpul Scrn:u'io ~ 3~
'I'hc pu~sihlc phasc diagralnti in Ihc Allractivc ('Ic:m Inplu Sccnariu arc illutilr:Ur(I in I~igurc 15.
Cascx (a) and (c) rcfcr lo ordinary saddlc points whilc thc cyuilibria in catics (h) and (d) arc
approached within tinite [ime; see, e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, pp. 397-402).
Since (13) and (14) imply that the discontinuities in the 1- 0 isocline move to the left as Z decreases,
the emission limit is mild in catie (a) and becomes morc and more tighter in cascs (b), (c), and (d),
respectively. Thereforc, in what follows the caseti (a), (b), (c), and (d) will be dcnolcd by Mild
I'mi.csinn l.imil Cu.ce, !nlcrnlr-Jirurl;ini.csirrn l,inlil Cn.er, Ïi,~lrl limi.t~sinn l,irtril ('n.cc~ and Vc-rv Ti~;lrl
l:ini.e.cinn Limi! ('a.rr, rctipcclivrly.
Wr only rlafxtraic on Ihr corrczpunding diagrantx for thr AUrartivr C'Ican Inpul Srcnario. Thc
di:ll;rants tin Scrnarius I:Ind ' arr vrry sintil:u'rxrrpt Ihal ra.cx (r) and (d) arr missing in Srcnariu
I and casc (d) is missing in Sccnario ~2~.'I'hc rcason fur Ihc laUcr is lhal in Ihc Modcralcly Attractivc
Clean Input Scenario ]2] it holdti that apart from thc lirtil discontinuity of thc Í-0 isocline at K- K,
this isocline remuins continuous. This is in contrast with the Attractivc Clean Input Scenario [3],
because for this scenario a second discontinuity occurs for K- K, und casc d represents that case
where intersection takes place exactly at this discontinuity.
II is cuttvcnicnl lu U'c:d Ihc fow' ca~cti (ll Ihc Allractivc ('Ic:m Inpul Sccnariu ticp:ualcly-
5.4J Mild b;mi~.tiiun I,imil Cau (a): cyuilibrium for K ~ K:
By (46a), this case is characterized by
Input Substi[ution
K K
(rta)C(aK)tvlS'(K)7 pQ~(K) (53)Hart) - Kort 21 Inpul Substiluliun
Clc:uiy, sincc C' :rnd S' arc incroatiinb and Q' is dccrcacing, Ihis catic corrctiprmdti to thc siluation of
milJ cmissivn limits (i.c. largc "L) for lixcd paramctcrs r, a, p, and vi. Notc that, by ( 13), thcrc is :r
monotonically incrcutiing rclation hctwccn K and Z.
Bccause [hc sum of marginal investment costs and marginal input co~ts cxcccds marginal rcvcnuc for
K- K it mukes economic sense that thc equilibrium cxcurr for K below K. In lhis case constraint
(9) is not binding in thc cyuilibrium which ix a suddlc point. Thc long run bchavior iti idcntical to the
unrcgulalcd caxc ( cf. Subscclion S.3). Only for inilial capilal stcx ks largcr Ihan K an inilial limc
inlcrval cxisl.ti wlrcrc u~ing Ih~ ~.I~:~n inpnl n. :urd, in c;rx~ Krr ?- K. Ic:rvinr .~~rur cap;rcity unu.c~l is
ncccssary lu salisfy lhc pollutiun wmlrainl. [)n Ihis intcrval, Ihc invctilnrcnl r:uc is xinallcr than in Urc
unrcgulatcd case. This situation is skctchcd in Figurc 16a.
I
~
Fi2ure 16a: Mild Emission Limit Casc (a) undcr thc Attractive Clcan Input Sccnario with a saddlc
pointfor K ~ K
Suppose that the firm starts out with a capital stock larger than K and thut lhix Icvcl is rcached at ti.
Supposc also [hat the Icvcl K iti rcachcd at timc t, ~ t~. Thcn thc ncgativc cl lccl on Ihc invcstmcnt
rate of leaving capacity unused on the interval [0, ti) and of using the expe;nsivc input A during the






'I'his cxprc~sion iti dcrivcJ liom (4i), (44) and (4K), and ti:ryx Ihal Ihc nct prcuunl valuc of marginal
invcstmcnt (NPVMI) cyuals r.cro. With olhcr words, likc with (52) in lhc unrc~,ulalcd c~u, lhc
additional invcstmcnt cxpc;nditurc C'(1), which iti ncccx~ary to acyuirc an additional unit of capital
stcxk, balances thc futurc cash Ilow gcncratcd by thi~ unil. Thiti cash Ilow, thal is corrcctcd for
Jcprcciution and discounting, cquals rcvcnuc from xclling pnxlucts m:rdc with Ux cxtra capital stcxkHurtl - Kort 22 Input Substitution
minux spcndings on Ihc vari:rhlc inpul n and I~ thal :rrc u.cd in Ihc pnxlucliun pnxc.x lugclhcr wilh
thc cxtra r.tpilal ~lixk. For K S K, thus iluring [hc inlcrval ~1,,~~, Ihr lirnt uscs Ihc chc:rp inpnl f.
:tnd thcrctorc marginal input xpcndinbscyual viS' ~lirxt trrm uf(S4)~. On thc inlrrval ~Il,l,~thc lirnr
must incre~u~ thc usc of thc cxpcntiivc input A and dccrcasc F to.ati.fy thc cmiaion constraint,
when thc Iirm wants to producc with full capacily and il :rcyuires cxlra capil:d stixk. This causcs
wmc cxlr:r cxpcnscx which ixcur in Ihc sccond Icnu ol'(54). I)uring I I,I ~~, Ihr lïrnr dixs nul
producc with lull cap:rciry, implyin~, thal Ihc cxlra capital slixk dixs nut c:ruzc cxlra rovcnuc antl
input expcntics. This Icuds to thc third tcrm in cyuation (54).
To summarize: the second and third term reflect the ncgativc cffects that input substitution and
unuscd capacity havc on thc NPVMI, respcctivcly, and thus on thc lirnt's invc~Imcnt rutc.
5.4.2 Intcrmcdiale 1?mictiion I,imil Casc (b): cquilibrium for K- K
By (46:rh), Ihis intcrmcdialc ca~c Lti charactcrizcd by
(rta)C(aK)tvlS'(K)SpQ"(K)S(rta)C(uK)tBS'(K) (SS)
which is thc cu.tic of intcrrncdialc valucx uf"L.
From the first inequ:tlity uf (SS) we infer that marginal revenuc excecds marginal invextment costs
plus marginal input costs of thc chcap inpul; so it would hc optimal to grow furthcr if no inpul
subxtitution wcrc ncccssary. f3ut whcn thc lirm growz tx:yonJ K, thcn inpul suhstilution iti nccdcd
(the expcntiive input hati to á: used) to meet the tilandard. I-Icnce, murginal cuxtx incrcase with thc
extra input costs and the second inequality of (55) says lhat total marginal costx excecd margin~l
rcvcnua This mcanx thal it iti oplim:rl for Ihc lirm to kccp Ihc Icvcl of capilal xlixk cyu:d tu K; scc




FiLUrc Ibb: Inlcrntcdialc L'utision Lintil ('a~c (h) undcr Ihc Altractivc (Ican Input Sccnario with
an eyuilibrium for K- K which is roachcd in linitc Iimc.
In general, investment and capital slock arc timaller Ihan in the unregulalcd catic. Malhcin:Hically, Ihc
equilibrium cunnot be called a tiaddle point, since thc r.h.s. of lhe dil7crential cyualiun for I is
discontinuou~ thcrc, sec (46~) and (4tíb). This yicld~:Hartl - Kort 23 Input Substitution
~C~l)~~'~ta~(1)-PQ~(K)tvlS'(K)~ ~.~I)~(rta~('"(I)-p(2'(K)tBS"(K)~~
l5(,)
for K- K; tiee also thc corresponding dilfcrential inclusion (4Sb) liir ~. in Ihc Appcndix.
It can bc vcrificd lhal liillowin~, (46a) or (46h) fur K ~ K ur K~ K anJ thcn, whcn thc point K- K
and I- uK is rcachcd, rcmaining tha'c, i~ in accordancc with thc xtatc cyuatiun (41) and with (56).
5.4.3 Til;ht Emi~.tiion I,imit Case (c): eyuilibrium for K ~ K ~ K
By (46b), thiti casc iti charactcrircd by
(rfu)C(aK)tBS~(K)~pQ'(K) und (rta)C'(aK)tBS'(K)~pQ'(K) (57)
which is lhc casc ul tighl cmission limils (i.c. small "1.). I luwcvcr, "1, is nol Ihat small Ihat it is
neccssary for thc lirm to usc only Ihc cxpcnsivc input A aflcr il hati rcachcd Ihc cyuilibrium.
For K- K, marginal rcvcnuc cxcccdz marginal costs, w that it iti actually oplimal to grow txyond
K. Thc rcvcrsc is truc for K- K tio that il makcs scntic Ihal thc long run cyuilihrium lics tx:low K.
In this casc contitraint (9) is binding in thc cyuilibrium which is a saddlc poinl; scc Figurc 16c .
1
K K~ K
Fiaure 16r. Tight Emission Limit Casc (c) under the Attractive Clean Input Scenario with a saddle
point for K c K ~ K.
Evcn when the constraint is not yet binding, invcstment is timaller than in thc unrcgulated case. This
is confirmed by the fact that also here the investment rate is determined such thal the NPVMI equals




where t, dcnotcs the point of timc at which the pollulion limit txxomes hinding.I I:u t I- Kurt '.! Inpul tiuh,truiu~m
Equalion (Sli) can lx; inlcrprclcd in thc samc w:ry a~ (541. Wr can concludc Ih:u whrn il dclcrmincs
its current investment rate, the lirm ~Iready takes inlo account the future substitution of the
expensive input A for the chcap input F, even when the pollution constraint is not yet binding. Noticc
that on this trajectory capacity is fully used everywhere.
5.4.4 Very Tight Emis,cion Limit Case (d): equilibrium for K- K
By (46b) this catic iti charactcrii.cd hy
(rta)C(aKItBS~(K)S pQ~(K) (5`~)
which is lhc caxc uf vcry tight cmistiiun liiuits (i.c. vciy srnall 'I,). Incyualily (Si)) inrplics lhal marginal
rcvcnuc cxcccd~ marginal cosls, so Ihat it sccrns to hc ciptimal lo grow Ix;yond K. Bul thc problcm
ix lhal hcrc thc cmissiun limit i.ti lhal light that il will alwayx Ix~ viulalcd il Ihc linn pnxluccs wilh full
capacity whilc K~ K, cvcn whcn only thc clcan input A is uscd. Thcrcforc, Ihc I,m); run cyuilibrium
cyualx K, bccausc it makcs nci xcnsc to h:rvc an cyuilihrium whcrc il is m,l alluwcd lo prcxlucc wilh
full capacily, which wuuld Fx~ Ihc ca~c if K' ~ K wilh K~ dcm,ling Ihc cyuilihriwn c:rpilal sluck.
I
K K K
FiPUre 16d: Vcry Tight Emission Limil Casc (d) undcr thc Attraclivc Clcan Input Sccnario with
equilibrium for K- K which is reachcd in linile timc
Ax ín case (h), Ihc cyuilibrium cannot tx called a tiaddlc point, since thc r.h.s. ol lhe differential




ti~r K - K.
Again, as in case (b), it can be verilied that following (46b) ur (4á;) for K ~ K ~ K or K~ K and
then, when the point K- K and I- aK ix rcnched, n;m:rining there, is in accordance with the statc
cquation (41) and with ((~).I lartl - Kort 2í Input Substitulion
It is interesting to note that for K ~ K it can be optimal to have a poxitive invcslntcnt rate, evcn if
capacity rcmainti unuscd. This is a cunuyucncc ul Ihr cunvcx intitallalion ruslx which makcs il
cheaper to spread out investmen[ ovcr time. Only for very largc valucs of K investment is r.cru or
even neg:ttivc (if disinvestmenl iti pcrmitlcd).
6. Conclusions
In our modcl, wc havc obtaincd thc following results:
'~ In all situ:uions, if Ihc capil:~l titock i, luw, thc invc~Imcn1 ratc should hc high and vicc vcrsa. Thi.
is a rcxuh rinnniun I~~ many invr.tilmcnl m~Klrls.
'~ If thcrc is no ccunumic inccntivc fur vulunlary subslituliun uf Ihc clcan inpul fur thc dirty input,
thc lirnt will not slarl Ihc input suh~liliniun lx~forc Ihc cmi~.iun cunslrainl is hit. This iti :m
argumcnt litr thc introduction of an rmisxion tax which, in gcncr;~l, allrcls thc lirmti' tx~haviur liir
all Icvrls iif cniissiun.
'~ If Ihc n~arginal cash Iluw pcr unil ul cmitixiunti is hi~hrr Gir ~hr ilirty iuput Ihan Gir Ihr clran
inpul, it can hc uptintal to Icavc wntc pruductiun capacily unu.ccd ralhcr than li~ usc Ihc
cxpcntiivc clcan input in thc production proccsti, in urdcr tu xatisfy Ihc cmixxion constraint.
'~ During thc wholc planning pcriod thc lirnis invcrtmcnt Icvcl is dclcnnincd such that marginal
invcstntcnt cxpcnditures balancc Ihc futurc cash flow titroam duc lo Ihi, cxtra unil of invcsUncnt.
This mcans Ihat thc nct prcu:nl valuc uf ntarginal invcstntcnl cyuals zcru. I~rom Ihis wc could
dctcrminc Ihc prccisc cffcctx on Ihc gruwlh uf Ihc lirm of INHh, inpul suhtilitutiun and Icaving
wntc capacity unuscd; xcc, c.g.. (S4). OI~cuursc. hoth clÏccts arc ncgativc. II lurns utu thal whcn
the firm dctcrmincs its currcnt invc~tntcnt ratc, it alrcady takcs into accuwu futurc input
substitution, cven whcn lhc pollution contitraint iti not yct binding.
'~ It is always optimal to approach a long run optimal Icvcl of capitul. In somc cascs, this
equilibrium is reached within finite time, but usually it will tx~ approached asymptotically.
`~ Consider the tiituation where equilibrium capitul slcxk is that large that, when producing with full
capacity anJ using unly Ihc dirty input, thc pollution titandard would Ix~ viulatcd. Thcn, in lhc
rcgulatcd casc, cyuilibrium capital ,tix:k anJ cyuilihrium invcsUncnl ratc arc luwcr cumparcd lu
Ihc unrcgulatcd ca~c.
'"' Sincc convcx installation cust suggctit tu tiproad oul invc~tntcnt ovcr Iimc, it can tx; optintal lo
have a positivc invcstmcnt ratc, cvcn if capacity rcmainx unuscd; scc Figurc 16d.
Clcarly, this modcl iti only a(irst stcp in modclling and analysing morc complicalcd modcls of the
finn wbjcct to cnvimnmcntal rcgulatiom. Possiblc cxtcnsionx and bcncrali,ations are:
r"I'hc cun~idrratiun uf an cnvirunmcnlal lax rathcr Ihan con~lrainl. This will Ix~ considcrcd in a
furthconting paprr.
~"I'o suidy a~ccnario whcrc Ihc pullution slandard txrunx~s lightcr ovcr timc in ordcr to givc the
linn xomc limc to adjusl lo strongcr cnvironmcnlal rcgulation, i.c., 7. - Z(t) wilh Z ~ 0.
~' 'fu rclax Ihr as~umpliun Ihat ti(K) is runvcx, i.c. th;d thc lutal variablr inpul nccd not incrcatic
morc Ih:m proporliunally wilh Ihc capit:d slixk. As in I lartJ anJ Kort (1993), Ihis rclaxation can
Icad I~i Ihr ix~rw'rcncr ul hislury dcltrndcnl cyuilibria.Hartl - Kort 26 Input Substitution
`d The assumption that the firm has some market power or even a monopoly. We expect that very
similar results will hold, if price is not fixed but follows an invertie demand function
p- p(Q). All we need to assutne in this case is that [hc revenue R(Q) - Qp(Q) is a concave
funclion of produclion Q, which is nut unusual. An cvcn wcakcr aszumpliun, which would also
sullicc is lhat rcvcnuc p(Q(K))Q(K) is a concavc funclion of capital K.
'a' To determine the role ofcompetition by considering un oligopoly rather than atomistic
compclition. Mcxlclling this situ:dion will Icad to a dil~fcromial gamc which will no[ ix caxy to
solvc.
'~ In this paper we studied how input substitution can be used by lhe firrn lo respond to
environmental rcgulation. It is importanl to considcr also lhc olher possiblc rcactions to
cnvironmcntal regulation likc invexting in pollution abatcmcnl dcviccs (fihcr:c) to clcan up, or
changing thc production prcxcss in a morc disruptivc way than input ~ubslilulion tu rcducc
cmissions.
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Appendix: Analysis of the adjoint equation at the kinks
First, we note that for K ~ K, i.e. Case I, equation (44) always reads
~-(rta~~.-pQ'(K)tv~S'(K). (44a)
with S' (K)- Q'( K)~G' (S( K)) since S( K)- G-~ (Q( K)).
In the intermediate interval, i.e. for K ~ K ~ K in thc Modcrately Attractivc Clcan Input Scenario
and for K c K ~ K in the A[tractive Clean Input Sccnario (i.c., Subcasc 2.2) result (39) from Lcmma
3 can be used to write equution (44) as:
íl-(rta~~,-pQ'(K)tBS'(K). (44h)
Finally, in the last intcrval, i.c., lor K ~ K in thc Unattractivc Clcan Inpul Sccnario (i.c., Sutxa.u
2.3), for K ~ K in the Moderately Attractivc Clcan Input Sccnario (i.e., Subcase 2.1), and for K~ K
in the Attractive Clean Input Scenurio (i.e., Subcase 3.2) equation (44) becomex
À.-(rta~À. (44r)
Now we can specify the intervals occurring in the diflerenlial inclusion (45):
In Sccnario I, (4i) al K- K hccomcs:
~.E I(rta~~,-pQ'(K)tv~S'lK). (rta~~,~. (4ia)
whcrc wc h:rvc uscd (44a) and (44c) liir Ihc Lh.ti. and r.h.x. buundary:
lt is clear [hat this interval is non-empty, since pQ'( K) ~ v~S'( K-) follows from
S'(K) - Q'(K)~G'(S(K)) and pG'(F) ~ v~, where the last inequality is implied by (17b).
On the other hand, in the Moderately Attractive Clcan Input Scenario and in thc Attractive Clean
Input Scenario, differential inclutiion (45) at K- K bccomes:
~,e~(rfa~.-pQ'(K)tv~S'(K), (rfa~í~-pQ'(K)tB S'(K)~ (4Sb)
where we have used (44a) and (44b). This interval is non-empty and non-dcgcncrate, bccau~e of
Lemma 4.
Furthermorc, in thc Modcrately Attractivc Clean Input Sccnurio and in the Attractive Clean Input
Scenario, (45) evaluated at K- K or K- K is obtained using (44b) and (44c):
~,e~(rfa~Á.-pQ'(K)tBS'(K). (rfa~À.~. (4Sc)
with K rcplaccd by K in the Mixlcratcly Auractivc Clcan Inpul Scenario. In Ihc Attractive Clean
Input Sccnario 3 thiti intcrvul is non-cmpty and non-dcgcncratc bccausc of pG'(A) ~ B and
S'(K)-Q'(K)~G'(S(K)).
On thc olhcr hand, in thc Modcratcly Auractivc Clcan Input Sccnario cyuation pG' - B in (31)
implics Ihal pQ' - BS' al K- K and Ihc inlrrval in (45r) coll:rpu~s to onc Ixiinl, i.c., ~l xatisfics lhc
Jiffrrrnli:d ryu:rtion (.Llrl in Ihix IH~inl.Discussion Paper Series, CeatER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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